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Advertising Policies of Medical
Journals: Conflicts of Interest
for Journal Editors and
Professional Societies
David Orentlicher, Michael K. Hehir II
s the medical profession becomes more and moreAof a commercial enterprise, commentators are sub-
jecting conflicts of interest in medicine to increas-
ing scrutiny. However, one critical area of conflict has largely
escaped discussion-the conflicts of interest raised by the
advertising policies of medical journals. Moreover, when
these conflicts are discussed, they are examined almost ex-
clusively in terms of the concerns that they pose for journal
editors. Yet, there is a second critical concern with journal
advertising policies. The policies also create serious con-
flicts of interest for the professional societies that own medi-
cal journals.'
In this article, we will discuss the conflicts of interest
that are raised for journal editors and professional societies
by journal advertising policies, and we will conclude that
the policies are exactly backward. Currently, medical jour-
nals rely on advertisements from pharmaceutical compa-
nies and other health-related businesses and avoid-indeed
exclude-advertisements from consumer-oriented compa-
nies, like producers of automobiles, golf equipment, or jew-
elry. We submit that the medical journals, the medical pro-
fession, and the public would be better served if consumer-
oriented advertisement were preferred over health-related
advertising.
Some of our arguments may seem harsh or unfair to
journal editors; the arguments may also suggest an unduly
skeptical view of the editorial process. In fact, we recognize
that journal editors approach their responsibilities with great
care and concern. We also recognize that journal editors go
to great lengths to ensure the integrity of their publications
and that journal quality reflects those efforts.2 Unfortunately,
even the most properly motivated efforts can be compro-
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mised by conflicts of interest. The problem with conflicts
of interest is that they operate insidiously.' As a result, it is
often necessary to guard against harm by reducing or elimi-
nating a conflict rather than by simply exercising great dili-
gence against its influence.
Current advertising policies
It is common practice for medical journals to run advertis-
ing only from companies in the health care industry. The
"Index to Advertisers" for the June 16, 1999 issue of the
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), for
example, lists twenty-four manufacturers of prescription
or over-the-counter drugs, one medical device manufac-
turer, and one medical publisher.4 This is not very surpris-
ing. One would expect drug companies and other purvey-
ors of health care products and services to be particularly
interested in reaching an audience of physicians. Moreover,
advertisers like to target their advertisements as closely as
possible to their intended audience and to avoid spending
money on readers who are not likely to purchase their goods.
The common practice, however, is not simply the re-
sult of a "natural" evolution of the journal advertising mar-
ketplace. It is also the result of a common policy of medical
journals to categorically refuse advertising space to compa-
nies that are not in a health care-related business. We con-
tacted six major professional journals, and none of them
runs nonhealth care advertisements. Three of the journals-
Annals of Internal Medicine, the New England Journal of
Medicine and Pediatrics-explicitly exclude nonhealth care
advertisements as part of their formal advertising policies.
For example, according to the "General Information" page
in each issue of Pediatrics, "All commercial advertising ap-
pearing in PEDIATRICS must relate to the practice of medi-
cine and be approved by the [American] Academy [of Pedi-
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atrics]."5 Two journals-the Journal of the American Col-
lege of Surgeons and Obstetrics & Gynecology-do not have
formal policies with regard to nonhealth care advertise-
ments. However, as an informal policy, they seek advertise-
ments only from health care companies. Finally, one jour-
nal that we contacted-JAMA-formally permits advertise-
ments from nonhealth-related companies. JAMA's policy
allows consumerproducts or services to be advertised, pro-
vided that (1) the inclusion of the advertisement does not
interfere with the purposes of the journal, and (2) the ad-
vertisement is not for an alcoholic beverage or tobacco prod-
uct. Limitations are also placed on advertising of dietary
programs and nutritional supplements. In the September 3
and November 12, 1997 issues of JAMA, Land Rover ran
advertisements for its Range Rover luxury sports utility
vehicles, 6 and other issues included advertisements for
Wellcraft powerboats and Steinway & Sons pianos. 7 How-
ever, since then, JAMA has decided that, for the foreseeable
future, it will reserve its advertising space for health-related
companies only.8
Ethical concerns from health industry advertising
Health-related advertising raises several ethical concerns, both
for journal editors and for professional medical societies.
Journal editors
Health care advertisements are problematic for journal edi-
tors in several ways. First, the acceptance of advertising may
result in a compromise of the quality of the editorial pro-
cess. Perhaps the clearest example of the editorial influence
of advertising occurs with respect to special symposium is-
sues of medical journals that are funded by pharmaceutical
companies. Researchers identified 625 symposium issues
in 58 leading medical journals from 1966-1989. For the
42 percent of the 625 symposia that were funded by a single
drug company (262 symposia), the journal was less likely
to adhere to its usual peer-review process.9 Another group
of researchers looked at articles published in journal supple-
ments, a category that overlaps considerably with the cate-
gory of symposium issues. The researchers found that the
supplement articles were of lower quality than articles pub-
lished in the parent journal. 10
Health care advertising may also influence the edito-
rial process in more subtle ways. Even when there is a sepa-
ration between the editorial and business offices, journal
editors are aware of the companies that purchase advertise-
ments. At.some leading journals, the editor-in-chief reviews
all advertisements after their first publication to ensure that
the advertisements comply with the journal's advertising
policy. Journal editors may feel a sense of gratitude to the
companies for their financial support.1 Indeed, one major
journal thanked its long-time advertisers by name on its
editorial pages. 12 Gratitude would encourage positive feel-
ings toward the companies, and those feelings could sub-
consciously influence editorial judgment. For example, if a
clinical study suggested that drug treatment was not as good
as surgical therapy for a subclass of patients with coronary
artery disease, and a journal received the bulk of its adver-
tising revenues from pharmaceutical companies, journal
editors may be more likely to reject a report of the study
because of concerns that the study design was not rigorous
enough. 3
Medical journals publish policy-oriented articles, and
editorial review of those articles could also be affected. If a
journal receives considerable revenues from industry ad-
vertising, the editors may be more receptive to articles that
criticize the advertising and marketing regulations of the
Food and Drug Administration. The editors also may be
less willing to publish commentaries that call for a reevalu-
ation of decisions by the federal government to expedite
the drug-approval process.
To be sure, we are not suggesting that journal editors
would justify their decision to accept or reject a manuscript
in terms of their gratitude for advertising dollars or even
that they would be aware of the connection. Rather, it stands
to reason that "objective" judgments by journal editors
would be influenced subconsciously by their subjective feel-
ings. Journal editors are no less susceptible to such influ-
ences than other people. And, we know that employers
making hiring decisions and landlords making rental deci-
sions give preference to the applicants about whom they
feel more positively because the applicants are thinner or
viewed as more physically attractive in other ways. 14 More
to the point, we know that financial incentives subcon-
sciously affect physicians' judgments when they make indi-
vidual treatment decisions. When a walk-in clinic changed
its compensation structure from a flat hourly wage to in-
clude bonuses that were tied to the income generated for
the clinic by diagnostic tests, the clinic's physicians started
ordering more laboratory tests and x-ray studies.'"
To an important extent, it is not in the interest of com-
panies if their advertising compromises the editorial pro-
cess. If readers perceive a decline in journal quality, they
may cancel their subscriptions, and the companies will no
longer be able to reach their desired audience. Some jour-
nals have apparently been hurt by perceptions that they let
advertising influence their editorial process. These consid-
erations suggest that journal editors would better express
their gratitude to their advertisers by avoiding any changes
in their procedures. Nevertheless, we cannot rely on the
self-interest of companies to protect against harm from
advertising. Companies themselves have conflicting inter-
ests. They want to advertise in high quality journals, but
they also want to sell their products. In the end, if a com-
pany has the second-best drug in a class, it will not see itself
as better off if medical journals make it abundantly clear
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that its drug is only second best. Moreover, companies of-
ten face conflicts between long- and short-term goals. A
compromised editorial process has long-term deleterious
effects for advertisers, but it may yield benefits in the short
term. Companies may seize the short-term gain, either be-
cause of investor pressures or because of the general ten-
dency of people to discount long-term risks.
A second important concern with health-related ad-
vertising lies in the appearance of impropriety. It may be
that medical journals erect effective "walls" between their
editorial and business offices and that editors consider only
scholarly merit when deciding which articles to publish.6
However, when journals generate millions of dollars in ad-
vertising revenues, it is very difficult for physicians and the
public to believe that these revenues have no effect on the
editorial process. Indeed, questions about collusion between
the editorial and business offices at JAMA arose in 1997,
when the journal published the results of a research trial
reporting the equivalence of generic and brand-name ver-
sions of synthetic thyroid hormone (used to treat patients
with hypothyroidism).1 7 In the issue with the results, two
full-page advertisements appeared for a generic version of
the hormone from a company that ordinarily did not ad-
vertise the product inJAMA. 8 AlthoughJAMA editors could
not explain how the generic manufacturer knew about the
research article, 9 the company stated that it had advance
knowledge and used it to place its advertisements.20
The appearance of impropriety can also be used to at-
tack the credibility of articles that appear in medical jour-
nals. When the New England Journal of Medicine published
articles,2' letters,22 and an editorial23 critical of alternative
medicines in its September 17, 1998 issue, a representative
of the company that produced one of the criticized medi-
cations24 argued on National Public Radio that the Journal
was biased against alternative medicines because of its rela-
tionship with the pharmaceutical industry.2s It may be that
the editorial decisions for that issue (or other issues) were
not influenced at all by the Journal's receipt of pharmaceu-
tical advertising dollars. Nevertheless, the possibility of such
influence can be used to undermine the credibility of the
Journal, as well as that of other journals.
Any erosion of trust in the editorial process is trouble-
some. Medical journals play a critical role in disseminating
the results of medical research. Readers rely on the journals
to identify the important studies and to ensure that the stud-
ies actually demonstrate what they purport to demonstrate.
If physicians discount a study because it might be tainted by
the journal's conflict of interest, the care of many patients
could suffer.
Third, and most important, even if there is no influ-
ence on the editorial process and no erosion of trust, edi-
tors compromise the scientific quality of their journals by
accepting health-related advertising. Although advertising
may provide some educational value, 6 advertisements of-
ten leave physicians with a skewed view of a product's bene-
fits and risks. In one study, researchers identified two cat-
egories of drugs (cerebral vasodilators and propoxyphene
compounds) for which commercial sources of information
made claims of efficacy that were substantially at odds with
what could be justified by the scientific literature. 27 Physi-
cians surveyed in the study reported that they relied on the
scientific literature and gave little weight to commercial
sources of information. Yet, for substantial percentages of
the physicians, actual beliefs and subscribing practices were
consistent with the commercial claims of efficacy. In an-
other study, experts reviewed 109 full-page pharmaceuti-
cal advertisements in ten leading medical journals. 2 The
experts concluded that 62 percent of the advertisements
should have been rejected or required to undergo major
revision. They also believed that 44 percent of the adver-
tisements would lead to improper prescribing if a physician
had only the information presented in the advertisement
about the drug. Health-related advertising, in short, may
diminish the scientific integrity of a journal because the
journal's audience reads and absorbs information from the
advertising as well as the scientific articles.29 This is of par-
ticular concern because many physicians (69 percent in one
study) identify medical journals as their most important
source of medical information.30
Professional societies
Although the conflicts of interest for journal editors are
readily recognized, the conflicts of interest for professional
societies are generally overlooked. Yet, these conflicts are
also of great concern.
Many of the leading medical journals are published by
professional societies. The American Academy of Pediat-
rics publishes Pediatrics, the American College of Physicians
(ACP) publishes Annals of Internal Medicine, the American
Medical Association (AMA) publishesJAMA, and the Mas-
sachusetts Medical Society (MMS) publishes the New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine. Similarly, the American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists publishes Obstetrics &
Gynecology, and the American College of Surgeons pub-
lishes the Journal of the American College of Surgeons. If
advertising revenues help to ensure a profit for a journal,
then the proceeds improve the bottom line of its parent
medical society.
Because professional societies disseminate information
about health care products, it is problematic that they bene-
fit from advertisements for those products. The AMA re-
ceived millions of dollars from pharmaceutical company
advertisements at the same time that it was publishing its
annual Drug Evaluations book (whose publication ceased
in 1995). It is not clear that the AMA could be sufficiently
objective in evaluating drugs when its budget was heavily
subsidized by the pharmaceutical industry."'
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When professional societies contribute to the public
debate on health care issues, they also face important con-
flicts of interest with respect to their receipt of advertising
dollars. On one hand, the societies have a duty to advocate
on behalf of patient welfare. On the other hand, certain
policy positions may affect the societies' revenues from
health care companies. If a particular position would be
good for patients but bad for pharmaceutical companies,
device companies, or other health care businesses, a profes-
sional society would help patients at the risk of hurting its
own financial well-being. Members of the affected industry
could limit their advertising expenditures either to retaliate
against the society or because the change in public policy
led to a decline in the companies' profits and therefore their
advertising budgets.
This conflict is especially serious because professional
societies play a critical role in the shaping of health care
policy in the United States. When the President, Congress,
state legislatures, or courts decide matters of health care
regulation or law, they rely substantially on the perspec-
tives of the medical profession as represented by their pro-
fessional organizations. 3 2 This is so not only because physi-
cians can explain how a change in policy or law will affect
the health care system, but also because lawmakers lack the
medical expertise that would make them confident about
their own perspectives.
As with the conflicts faced by journal editors, appear-
ances of impropriety are also important here. Even if a pro-
fessional society's positions are not in fact influenced by
their receipt of advertising revenues, people will wonder
whether the professional society was so influenced. If the
AMA opposes price controls on prescription drugs, for ex-
ample, the public will be unsure whether the opposition is
truly rooted in legitimate concerns, like the potentially harm-
ful effects on research spending by industry, or whether the
opposition reflects the AMAs defense of its own pecuniary
interests. Similarly, if other readers of both the AM.s Drug
Evaluations and the independent Medical Letter found, as
one of us did, that the authors of The Medical Letter gave
more definitive prescribing recommendations and were
more likely to conclude that there was nothing to be gained
by prescribing some drugs instead of their alternatives, a
the readers might have wondered whether the AMA.s analy-
ses were subconsciously affected by the Association's inter-
est in maintaining good relations with all of the companies
in the pharmaceutical industry.
Countervailing benefits of health industry
advertising
Given the potential harms from health care advertising in
medical journals, the editors should refuse health care ad-
vertisements unless there are countervailing benefits that
outweigh the risks. We will now discuss the benefits and
consider whether they are sufficient to justify health care
advertising in medical journals. In doing so, it is useful to
consider whether journals should be able to rely only on
the health care industry for their advertising or whether
journals should be able to rely on the health care industry
together with other industries for advertising.
Exclusive reliance on health care advertising
As mentioned, it is common for medical journals to accept
advertisements only when they feature a health-related prod-
uct or service.34 We find it hard to see how this policy can
be justified. If advertisements are accepted from airlines (for
example, Delta), credit card companies (for example, Ameri-
can Express), golf equipment suppliers (for example, Calla-
way), jewelers (for example, Tiffany's), or automobile manu-
facturers (for example, Cadillac), journals would have a
larger pool of companies to which they could sell advertis-
ing space, and they would reduce the conflict of interest
that arises from the practice of only accepting health care
advertisements. This suggests that health care companies
are not the first place medical journals should look for ad-
vertising. Rather, they are the last place medical journals
should look.
To be sure, medical journals and their parent profes-
sional societies would owe the same sense of gratitude to
these other companies, but it is hard to see how their rela-
tionships with the companies Would come into conflict with
their duties to scientific integrity and patient welfare. IfJAMA
accepted advertisements from the Callaway Golf Company
for its Big Bertha golf driver, JAMA editors might add the
club to their golf bags, and the AMA might oppose efforts
by the Professional Golfers' Association to regulate golf club
size;"5 but these activities would not affect the quality of
JAMA or of health care delivery in this country. Similarly, if
the Annals of Internal Medicine ran advertisements for Delta
and USAirways, the editors at Annals might start flying those
airlines more often, and the ACP might oppose govern-
ment regulations that would help start-up airlines, but these
activities also would not compromise journal quality or
health care delivery.
Some journal editors explain a policy of accepting only
health-related advertising as a way to foster the mission of
their journals. In this view, health-related advertisements
are included because they have educational value that aug-
ments the information provided by the journal's articles.
Nonhealth-related advertisements, on the other hand, would
not contribute to the journal's educational mission. 6 This
argument is not persuasive. The mission of medical jour-
nals is to provide the most reliable educational information
available. However, as discussed above, advertisements com-
promise the educational value of medical journals. Adver-
tisers see education as one of their goals, but it is secondary
to the primary aim of using advertisements to increase sales.
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Typically, a company can maximize its profits by providing
imperfect rather than perfect information to potential con-
sumers. To put it another way, medical schools would not
give classroom time to pharmaceutical company sales rep-
resentatives as a way to enhance their educational mission.
The U.S. Supreme Court also has rejected the argu-
ment that health-related advertising fosters the educational
mission of medical journals.3 7 The issue has come up be-
cause advertising revenues would constitute tax-exempt
income if the advertising "contributes importantly" to the
educational purposes of a journal's tax-exempt, parent pro-
fessional society. When the ACP asked for a refund of taxes
paid on advertising revenues from the Annals of Internal
Medicine, the Supreme Court concluded that, although
advertising might in theory contribute importantly to a
journal's educational mission, it did not in fact do so in the
case of Annals. The Court observed that the journal's ad-
vertising decisions turned on whether companies were will-
ing to pay for the space (rather than on the goal of provid-
ing a systematic presentation of the goods or services being
advertised) and that the repeated advertising of established
drugs undermined the claim that the advertisements were
principally designed to alert readers to new developments. 3
Another possible justification for the exclusion of non-
health advertising lies in aesthetic considerations. It may
seem in poor taste to run advertisements for cars, credit
cards, or jewelry in a professional journal. However, aes-
thetic tastes are not a sufficient reason to embrace a signifi-
cant conflict of interest. Tackiness is a small price to pay for
greater scientific integrity and higher quality health care.
Of course, when advertising goes beyond tackiness to include
deception or fraud or otherwise to promote unethical prac-
tices, the advertising should be rejected. But mere bad taste
is less troubling than a financial conflict of interest.
It seems fairly clear, then, that medical journals should
eliminate their requirement that advertisements come only
from companies with a health-related product or service.
The harder question is whether journals should sell some
of their advertisement space for health-related products or
services. 39
Reliance on both health-related and other kinds of
advertisements
We could conclude that medical journals should sell adver-
tising space only to nonhealth-related companies. Such a
practice would avoid the conflicts of interest from health-
related advertising. Moreover, many consumer-oriented
companies, especially sellers of luxury items, ought to be
interested in advertising to a readership with the average
household income of physicians.
However, it may be the case that excluding health-re-
lated advertisements would have negative consequences for
medical research and education. Journals could see a de-
crease in their advertising revenues if they excluded health-
related advertising. Any advertiser can reach physicians
when they advertise to the public at large through maga-
zines like Business Week or Time, but health-related com-
panies probably have a stronger interest than nonhealth
care companies in targeting physicians specifically with their
advertisements. 40 Indeed, an almost exclusive reliance on
pharmaceutical advertisements exists even with Diversions,
a magazine for physicians with articles about leisure activi-
ties and therefore a seemingly natural place for airlines,
hotels, and speedboat manufacturers to advertise. Journals
that have tried to interest nonhealth care companies in ad-
vertising have apparently found it difficult to do so. More-
over, health-related companies may especially perceive an
advantage in having their advertisements appear in leading
medical journals. Association with the journals may result
in some of the journals' prestige rubbing off on the compa-
nies. Given the benefits of advertising in medical journals,
health-related companies are probably willing to pay higher
rates than are other kinds of companies for medical journal
advertising. If excluding health-related advertisements re-
duces the revenue of medical journals, the journals might
have to curtail the number of issues or the number of pages
per issue. Fewer articles would be published, and medical
research and education could suffer.
A key question, then, is whether the financial benefits
for medicine from health-related advertising are sufficient
to outweigh the harms from the advertising.4' This is an
empirical question that is difficult to answer. On one hand,
a loss of journal pages would compromise the ability of
researchers to publish important information. On the other
hand, currently a very large number of medical journals are
being published; hence one could argue that fewer journals
would ensure that only studies of high quality are pub-
lished.4 2 In the face of this uncertainty, it may make the
most sense for journals to reject health-related advertising
unless they find that, by doing so, they meaningfully com-
promise their educational mission.
In this regard, it is relevant that many leading journals
in other professional fields do not rely as heavily on adver-
tisements that raise the kinds of concerns posed by adver-
tisements in medical journals. The Harvard Law Review,
for example, contains only a few pages of advertisements
in each issue, mostly from academic presses. Journals like
the American Political Science Review and the American
Sociological Review contain a good deal of advertising from
academic presses, but the connection between editorial de-
cisions and the interests of academic presses seems much
more tenuous than the connection between editorial deci-
sions at medical journals and the interests of pharmaceuti-
cal companies. The advertisements do create a conflict of
interest for the journal editors to the extent that the jour-
nals publish book reviews, but the conflict would not ex-
tend much beyond that particular area.43
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Although there is some uncertainty about the propri-
ety of health-related advertisements for medical journals,
we can say with confidence that a number of the journals
would not suffer if they dropped health-related advertis-
ing. For example, the New England Journal of Medicine
covers its costs of publication between subscription fees and
classified advertisement charges; it uses the revenues from
health company advertisements to subsidize the programs
of the MMS. 44
When advertising revenues are used to fund the pro-
grams of the parent professional societies, as they are for
many journals, 4 the argument for accepting health-related
advertising is weak. The case for health-related advertising
depends on the view that an important public benefit de-
rives from subsidies for the activities of medical professional
societies. It does not seem very persuasive to justify health-
related advertising as a way to ensure funding for profes-
sional society activities. Professional societies primarily serve
the interests of their members. For example, on key public
policy questions, the AMAs positions often put the needs
of physicians before those of patients.4 Paul Starr has de-
scribed the AMA's opposition to the development of health
maintenance organizations and the enactment of the Medi-
care program. 47 More recently, the AMA helped defeat Presi-
dent Clinton's efforts to ensure universal health care cover-
age,48 and the AM.s own investigators criticized it for fail-
ing to protect patient welfare and the integrity of the pa-
tient-physician relationship when it endorsed a legislative
ban on partial birth abortions.49 The AMA's canceled en-
dorsement of Sunbeam home health care products was an
especially troubling example of self-serving behavior.5 0 Given
the orientation of professional societies to the needs of their
members, the members should support the societies' activi-
ties with their dues and other contributions.
Professional societies often undertake public-spirited
programs, like the AMA.s SmokeLess States Tobacco Use
Prevention Program. However, such programs typically
consume a relatively small percentage of a society's general
operating budget. Often, the programs rely almost entirely
on grants from foundations or the federal government, with
the professional society providing office space and staff sup-
port.5' Accordingly, even though some of a journal's adver-
tising revenues help subsidize the programs, the bulk of the
revenues goes to the society's other activities. That kind of
imbalance prevents us from justifying the conflicts of inter-
est from health-related advertising in terms of the public
good from professional society programs. In other words,
while professional societies can, and often do, act in the
public interest, revenues from their journals probably do
not play an important role in their ability to do so.
Conclusions
Conflicts of interest cannot be eliminated entirely in medi-
cine, nor would we want to eliminate all of them. For ex-
ample, pharmaceutical company researchers often will have
valuable insights to share with their academic colleagues.
Hence, we would not want their conflicts of interest to
preclude their participation in professional conferences.
Nevertheless, it is important to eliminate unnecessary
conflicts of interest. Health-related advertising in medical
journals raises serious conflicts of interest for journal edi-
tors and professional societies. At the very least, medical
journals should amend their advertising policies to permit
advertisements from nonhealth-related companies. Indeed,
the journals should look first to nonhealth-related compa-
nies for advertising revenues. A strong case can also be made
for the position that journals should accept advertisements
only from nonhealth-related companies. In particular, for
those journals that can cover their costs of publication with-
out health-related advertising, the case for health-related
advertisements is very hard to sustain.
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